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Abstract: 
Whether officials can be trusted to protect national security information has become a matter of 
great public controversy, reigniting a long-standing debate about the scope and nature of official 
secrecy. The declassification of millions of electronic records has made it possible to analyze 
these issues with greater rigor and precision. Using machine-learning methods, we examined 
nearly a million State Department cables from the 1970s to identify features of records that are 
more likely to be classified, such as international negotiations, military operations, and high-level 
communications. Even with incomplete data, algorithms can use such features to identify 90% 
of classified cables with <11% false positives. But our results also show that there are 
longstanding problems in the identification of sensitive information. Error analysis reveals many 
examples of both overclassification and underclassification. This indicates both the need for 
research on inter-coder reliability among officials as to what constitutes classified material and 
the opportunity to develop recommender systems to better manage both classification and 
declassification. 
 
Main Text: 
Draft only -- Not for circulation without authors’ permission 
2 
 
More than one hundred countries have adopted laws or administrative measures giving citizens 
a right to information about what governments do in their name. But certain categories are 
typically excluded, whether because of national security or personal privacy. Distinguishing 
between what citizens are entitled to know and what officials are obliged to withhold is therefore 
a growing challenge, one that is compounded by the rapid growth in the volume of government 
records. In the U.S. and other countries records managers and archivists are struggling to cope, 
especially because electronic records like e-mail require new methods for processing and 
preservation (Moss 2012). This quantitative growth and qualitative transformation poses 
profound questions about the nature of democratic accountability in the age of “big data.” As the 
conditions for research in historical records change, it will require rethinking how we study 
international relations (Allen and Connelly 2016).   
 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request that revealed former Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton’s private e-mail server has put these challenges in stark relief. ​The FBI concluded that 
Clinton was “extremely careless” in overlooking sensitive information and failing to preserve 
public records (Comey 2016). Clinton’s defenders argue that what is classified is “almost 
random,” and that her practices were not unlike those of her predecessors (Lowell 2016). Both 
sides agree that ​it took too long to review (and redact) the 54,000 pages of e-mail she turned 
over to authorities, only for the FBI to re-open the inquiry ten days before the election when 
additional e-mail emerged. In response to another FOIA request for the e-mail of three of 
Clinton’s top aides, which amounted to 450,000 pages, the State Department estimated that it 
would take seventy-five years to review all the material (LoBianco 2016). But this is just the tip 
of the iceberg. ​It is thought that the State Department generates two billion e-mail every single 
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year (McAllister 2010​)​ .  
 
Current declassification methods are clearly inadequate to cope with the volume of potentially 
sensitive information that is now being generated (Public Interest Declassification Board 2012)​. 
But it is likely that many of these e-mail along with other electronic records will be lost before 
anyone has a chance to review them. The Office of the Inspector General found that the e-mail 
of many senior officials from just a few years ago may never be recovered because of lost 
passwords or corrupted files (State Department OIG 2016). 
 
What can we reasonably expect from government officials charged with protecting sensitive 
information, and is it possible to develop systems that might help officials manage both 
classification and declassification more rapidly and more reliably? To date, there has been 
virtually no government investment in research that might answer these questions. The U.S. 
spent over $16 billion in 2015 to protect classified information. Just the increase in spending on 
secrecy over the last two years -- $4.5 billion -- is nearly ten times more than the government 
spends on administering the Freedom of Information Act (Department of Justice 2015), and 
more than ten times as much as the entire budget of the U.S. National Archives (ISOO 2015). 
But we have yet to see a single controlled experiment to determine to what extent officials agree 
on what information should be classified.  
 
Theorists have long speculated as to the reasons why even democratic regimes invest so much 
more in secrecy than transparency. Excessive secrecy, or “overclassification,” has long been 
recognized as contrary to the ostensible purpose of protecting sensitive information. It dilutes 
the meaning of classification and undermines respect for security procedures (Commission on 
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Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy 1997). In recent years, the persistence of high 
levels of secrecy -- notwithstanding the Obama administration’s pledge to be the most 
transparent in history -- has renewed interest in whether a preference for concealment is 
intrinsic to bureaucracy (Sagar 2013, Pozen 2010). As Max Weber famously argued:  
 
This superiority of the professional insider every bureaucracy seeks further to 
increase through the means of ​keeping secret​  its knowledge and intentions. 
Bureaucratic administration always tends to exclude the public, to hide its 
knowledge and action from criticism as well as it can. (Weber 1922) 
 
In his classic history of official secrecy in Britain, David Vincent points out that Weber was really 
describing ideal types. Historical research reveals that not ​every​  bureaucracy has sought to 
maximize secrecy, and the amount of secrecy within the same bureaucracy can ebb and flow 
over time. (Vincent 1999) In 1997, during a period of relatively greater transparency in U.S. 
foreign policy following the end of the Cold War, the landmark report of the Moynihan 
Commission on Government Secrecy also drew on historical research in concluding that 
secrecy is best seen as a form of regulation (Commission on Protecting and Reducing 
Government Secrecy 1997). The problem since the very founding of the Republic is that, unlike 
other forms of regulation, there is no effective mechanism for determining whether the Executive 
is managing secrecy appropriately (Hoffman 1981; Sagar 2013).  
 
A key challenge is therefore in determining what kinds of information really do require 
safekeeping, especially since the evidence from the past is largely anecdotal. Developing a 
richer, more robust theory of official secrecy that can both account for variation in classification 
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practices and inform more effective regulation requires empirical research. As Vincent 
acknowledges, while qualitative research in archives can reveal how officials keep secrets, it is 
less suited to revealing the larger patterns in what kinds of information they typically conceal. 
Computational analysis of declassified records can identify both patterns and anomalies, and 
show whether practices are consistent enough as to become predictable. This is both a good 
test of theory and the essential precondition for any technology that would assist in the 
management of sensitive information. When it comes to the Clinton e-mail, such methods can 
show what is normal and what might be considered negligent in how officials manage large 
numbers of potentially sensitive communications.  
 
The release of the first generation of U.S. government electronic records presents new 
opportunities to analyze this problem using well-developed methods from natural language 
processing (NLP) and machine-learning. We report on the performance of algorithms developed 
to automatically identify sensitive information. We trained and tested these algorithms using 
some one million diplomatic cables from the 1970s that were originally marked as “secret,” 
“confidential,” “limited official use,” or “unclassified.” Cables were the main form of secure 
communications in this period, and since the original metadata include not only the classification 
level, but also the sender, recipient, date, and subject, these cables -- and research analyzing 
these cables -- are quite relevant to management challenges for newer types of 
communications, notably e-mail. They can show whether classification has historically been 
random or predictable, and analyzing the errors machines make in identifying sensitive 
information can help us understand the errors that humans make.  
 
This article begins with a discussion of the materials and methods used in the experiment. We 
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then identify the features most characteristic of classified communications. We analyze how 
different theories of official secrecy can help explain the data, and how computational methods 
yield new insights. We then present the results obtained when we apply these insights to 
different classification tasks, depending on whether we define secrecy more or less broadly. 
Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings both in terms of the recent Clinton e-mail 
controversy and future prospects for technology that could better manage both classification 
and declassification.  
  
Materials and Methods: 
 
Our task was to use features from the metadata and the message text to predict whether a 
given document would be classified or unclassified. In essence, we take a set of observations in 
which the category membership is known to create a training set. We then use this data to train 
a statistical model that scores the probability of new observations taken from a random sample 
to belong to the same category. Ironically, in data science this is known as a classification task. 
 
We obtained our data from the Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF) of the U.S. State 
Department, which are available from the U.S. National Archives in the form of XML files on 
DVDs. The CFPF was also the source of the classified diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks 
in 2010-11. But the best available estimate is that the 251,000 Wikileaks cables constitute only 
5-6% of all the cables produced in 2005-10 (Gill and Spirling, 2015). Even that estimate requires 
assuming that the release constituted a random sample. But it seems unlikely that a random 
sample of U.S. diplomatic cables would feature more mentions of the Wrangel Islands than 
Russia​.  
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There are also gaps in the declassified documents from the 1970s, and neither corpus includes 
the relatively few documents classified as “Top Secret.” But the great advantage of using 
declassified historical data is that we can analyze the lacunae using both the appraisal records 
of archivists and the metadata that is available even for corrupted or still-classified records.  
 
The National Archives appraisal of the electronic records of the CFPF shows how archivists and 
records managers endeavored to preserve all historically significant records among the 27 
million that had accumulated by 2006. This corpus was both quantitatively and qualitatively 
different from the paper records archivists were accustomed to dealing with. They analyzed it by 
utilizing the 188 subject “TAGS” the original State Department drafters had assigned to each 
record since the system was created in 1973. This metadata field, which also included TAGS for 
each country, was intended to facilitate “Traffic Analysis by Geography and Subject.” Archivists 
used it to identify and preserve all records from the 93 subject TAGS belonging to the broad 
categories of Political Affairs, Military Affairs, Social Affairs, Economic Affairs, Technology and 
Science. For the 95 other subject TAGS on things like Operations, Administration, and Consular 
Affairs, they reviewed a sample that totalled over seven thousand cables to decide which TAGS 
merited preservation even if the cables were not cross-referenced with other, more obviously 
significant subject TAGS.  
 
The CFPF is therefore a curated corpus, but the effect of prioritizing the preservation of 
historically significant records was to reduce the relative proportion that was unclassified.  
Of the top forty TAGS ranked by the relative number of cables classified “secret,” only one was 
from the Operations, Administration, or Consular Affairs categories, and that was for the 
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Administration of the State Department’s ​Bureau of Intelligence and Research​ (AINR.)  
Even these records, which archivists decided to retain, were relatively mundane -- travel 
reservations and the like. The largest groups of cables that archivists decided not to preserve 
were those related to Visas, Personnel, and Financial Management (Langbart 2007).  
 
In training the algorithms to identify classified communications, we also had to exclude 
non-cable records that did not include the message text in digital form, such as paper records, 
many of which were delivered via diplomatic pouch (“p-reel” records). In addition, there are 
410,539 “withdrawn” cables where only the metadata has been declassified. We also had to 
exclude cables that had no text or just “n/a” for the features we used in building the classifier 
(see Table 5, and see also the Supplementary Information). 
 
The available metadata shows that about the same percentage of the withdrawn cables were 
originally classified as secret as compared to the cables that were released (5.2% versus 5.3%). 
The reason is that many records are withheld because they contain personally identifiable 
information and not national security information. Even fewer P-reel documents were originally 
classified secret (2.6%). Conversely, when we identified features in the metadata characteristic 
of the most secret communications, we found little difference in the rankings whether or not we 
included metadata from the withdrawn cables, and whether these communications were cables 
or p-reel records. 
 
But there is one category of missing data that is quite distinct in terms of secrecy: 128,026 
cables were meant to be preserved because they have TAGS deemed to be historically 
significant, but there is no message text for these cables in the State Department Automated 
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Data System -- only metadata. According to the U.S. National Archives, the State Department 
lost some of the data during migration between different hardware and software platforms,  but 
“some telegrams were intentionally deleted from the electronic repository.” (National Archives 
and Records Administration 2016). There are intriguing patterns in the missing data, to be 
discussed below.  
 
For purposes of the experiment, the main problem with incomplete data is that it increases the 
difficulty of developing algorithms to automatically identify classified communications. But since 
we still have the metadata even for these withdrawn and incomplete records, we can use them 
to begin analyzing what kinds of information is typically classified. We will do that by identifying 
the features in the metadata that are most useful in predicting which cables are secret, such as 
who sent or received the cable, what topic it concerned, and what keywords the authors used to 
categorize it. We then compute which embassies, topics, and keywords had the highest 
proportion of secret cables.  
 
In preparing the remaining 981,083 cables for the machine classification experiment, we carried 
out many standard NLP operations to process the raw textual data, starting with tokenization. 
Compound names of places in textual fields were aggregated, enabling them to be treated as a 
single token (i. e. NEW YORK was transformed to NEWYORK). This step was especially 
important in the case of the ​from​  and ​to​  fields, which represent the names of the embassies. 
These fields were aggregated in a new field, ​sender/recipient​ , for the vectorization process. We 
also eliminated all the trailing punctuation and words with length of 1. While underscores and 
hyphens in the middle of words were maintained, hyphenation was otherwise eliminated from 
textual fields. So too were stopwords using the NLTK (Bird 2009) English stopwords list.  
Draft only -- Not for circulation without authors’ permission 
10 
 
Some of the available metadata indicated how these records were reviewed before release. But 
to test the feasibility of a system to recommend the appropriate classification under real world 
conditions, we only used data that would be available to a human -- or a computer -- before a 
cable is sent. In addition to the message text (the ​body​  field), we found the following features 
most useful in distinguishing more classified cables from the rest of the corpus: 1) 
sender/recipient​ , a combination of the “from” and “to” fields, which typically is an embassy or 
office; 2) ​concepts,​  standard keywords used to categorize each document; 3) ​subjec​ t, a short 
description; 4) ​office​ , the part of the State Department with responsibility for either originating or 
acting on a cable; 5) ​TAGS​ , for Traffic Analysis by Geography and Subject. 
 
For each one of the features, and many feature combinations, we applied different forms of 
vectorization and tested the prediction power of the resulting vectors using several types of 
classifiers and ensembles. Most machine learning algorithms require fixed length vectors as 
inputs. For bodies of text, vectorization steps were performed using a Bag of Words (BoW) 
(Harris 1954) approach, using plain term counts or some form of weighting such as TfIdf (Term 
Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency, Spärck 1972). 
 
All these vector transformations have parameters: the size of the vocabulary; the n-gram range 
taken in consideration (single tokens are unigrams; two consecutive tokens are bigrams, etc.); 
the choice of whether to eliminate stopwords; the minimum and maximum document 
frequencies; among others specific to each feature. We undertook extensive tests and 
hyperparameter optimization (Bergstra 2012) to determine the best parameters (Table S.4). 
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For this corpus TfIdf did not perform better than plain term frequencies in the BoW vectors. 
Despite having bigger vocabulary sizes, the fields ​subject​ , ​concepts,​  and ​body​  have been 
represented using a vocabulary that only considers the top N words ordered by term frequency 
across the corpus. For the ​TAGS​  and ​Office​  fields, all distinct tokens that appeared in more than 
five cables were taken into account. For the new field ​sender/recipient,​  we have discarded those 
that appeared in fewer than six cables, which can be indicative of misspellings.  
 
We have used cross validation to test the performance of different models and avoid over-fitting, 
i.e. choosing a model that would perform poorly on data outside the sample. This entailed 
setting aside a random selection of cables and -- after training our classifier with the rest of the 
data -- testing the accuracy of its predictions for the randomly selected cables. We used the 
stratified k-fold method, maintaining the proportion of classes ( “unclassified,” “limited official 
use,” “confidential,” “secret”) in each fold. The k-fold itself uses k folds for training and test sets. 
We have chosen three folds for each classifier, trained with the training set and evaluated with 
the test set.  
 
Rather than using just one classifier for this task, we tested twelve different classification models 
to evaluate their overall performance in terms of the AUC\ROC metric (Hanley 1982, Davis 
2006, and see SI). Based on these tests, we built an ensemble of the seven best-performing 
algorithms using different weights for each: ​Stochastic Gradient Descent, Logistic Regression, 
Ridge, Bagging, Extremely Randomized Trees, AdaBoost and Multinomial Naive Bayes​. This 
can be likened to assembling experts and giving them more or less weight depending on their 
comparative reliability. 
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Upon determining that using all features as independent vectors produced the best results, we 
applied this method to four different tasks: (U)nclassified vs (L)imited Official Use, (C)onfidential, 
and (S)ecret; U, L vs C, S; U, L, C vs S; and U vs C,S (Table 4). One could make further 
adjustments to the parameters, but we do not believe they would bring more than marginal 
gains, and the generalizability of the model would be compromised. Instead, we believe that this 
model could be used with similar kinds of data to achieve similar results, such as future releases 
from the same Central Foreign Policy Files. 
 
What Makes Secret Cables Different? 
 
The scale and multi-dimensional nature of data from formerly classified diplomatic 
communications illustrates the need to use machine-learning methods to identify patterns and 
anomalies for otherwise hard-to-observe phenomena (Monroe et al. 2015). In this experiment, 
there were 40,700 possible features for each of the 918,083 records (Table S4). This much data 
precludes a purely qualitative analysis. Instead, it rewards an approach that allows for multiple 
combinations of variables and differently weighting each variable depending on the task at 
hand. And once we determine the features that are most useful in identifying classified records, 
we can look more closely at each one to indicate the kind of patterns that combine to create 
accurate predictions.   1
 
One feature we did ​not​  find to be useful in predicting whether a record was more or less likely to 
be classified was the month and year it was dispatched. This is partly because it is difficult to 
1 ​This part of the analysis is limited to cables grouped by origin/destination, TAGS, and 
concepts, since other useful fields -- like Office, and the words in the message -- were not 
available for records that were withdrawn or where the message text is missing. 
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divide up the data temporally, since patterns of activity change with weekends and holidays, and 
some units -- like months -- are of variable length. But it’s also because there was no clear trend 
or pattern in the proportion of classified diplomatic communications. The overall level of secrecy 
was little changed during the first two years of the Carter administration as compared to the time 
that Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State. (See Fig. 1) This is surprising, considering how the 
context of diplomacy in the period 1973-78 was becoming increasingly hostile to official secrecy, 
after the revelations of the secret bombing of Cambodia, Watergate, and the Church Committee 
hearings on covert CIA operations. Shortly after assuming office in 1977, Jimmy Carter 
famously rejected Kissinger’s penchant for secrecy, promising “​a foreign policy that the 
American people both support and, for a change, know about and understand​.” Echoing 
Woodrow Wilson, he insisted that “​Our policy must shape an international system that will last 
longer than secret deals. We cannot make this kind of policy by manipulation. Our policy must 
be open; it must be candid…” (Carter 1977) 
 
In fact, over the period 1973-78 communications regarding the same kinds of subjects 
continued to be classified: military matters and international negotiations. The posts that 
transmitted the highest percentage of secret cables include officials negotiating the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Treaties and the ​Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction agreements​, those 
reporting from or to military staff headquarters, and those working at two embassies -- Cairo and 
Tel Aviv -- that were a focus of U.S. diplomacy leading up to the Camp David Accords (see 
Table 1). 
 
Until recently, even the strongest proponents of transparency conceded that diplomacy must 
sometimes be conducted in secret, particularly when it comes to the use of force and statecraft. 
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Woodrow Wilson himself conducted the negotiations for the Versailles Treaty behind closed 
doors even after promising “​open covenants of peace, openly arrived at” in his famous Fourteen 
Points​. (Nicholson 1964) As ​François de Callières​ noted three centuries ago in a classic guide 
to diplomatic practice, secrecy is “the life of negotiations.” (De ​Callières​ 1716) Even before the 
founding of the United States, the Continental Congress deemed the dispatches of the first 
American diplomats to be secret by default. The Constitutional Convention -- itself conducted in 
secret -- sought a strong executive who could act with secrecy and dispatch. (Hoffman 1981) 
Jeremy Bentham argued that transparency made government more efficacious, but agreed it 
should be “suspended” if it were calculated “​To favour the projects of an enemy.” (Bentham 
1843) While railing against the “growing evil” of official secrecy, Giuseppe Mazzini conceded it 
was necessary to “Let diplomacy have its secrets, for diplomacy is but a refined mode of 
modern warfare...” (Mazzini 1844) Diplomats have defended secrecy by arguing that 
confidential negotiations are an ​alternative ​ to warfare, and far preferable (​Nicholson 1964)​. 
 
The same pattern of protecting records related to international negotiations and military 
operations is evident in an analysis of the 862 Concepts, or keywords, State Department 
officials used to organize diplomatic cables (see Table 2). But so too is the tendency -- already 
evident in cables sent to the White House -- for the most senior officials to pursue special 
protection for their own communications. Ironically, the already notorious problem of 
overclassification made this more difficult. It was not just outside critics like Jimmy Carter who 
complained about the problem of excessive secrecy. Richard Nixon expressed frustration at the 
way even categories like “top secret” had become so overused as to lose real value or meaning. 
He favored creating a new designation indicative of an even higher level of exclusivity (Blanton 
2003) 
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In 1974 the State Department created special designations for communications involving the 
most senior officials. Cables with the “CAT-C,” “CAT-B,” and “CAT-A” concepts continued to be 
highly classified during the Carter administration. Conversely, Concepts associated with few or 
no secret cables (<1%) are indicative of the kinds of subjects -- like “music” and “meats” -- that 
senior officials considered less important or less urgent (see Table 3).  
  
There is also evidence that certain records were removed from the State Department 
Automated Data System. According to the National Archives, many of the cables where we 
have complete metadata but no message text are available on microfilm. Moreover, we do not 
know when the data were migrated, and the electronic versions of messages were lost. But it’s 
notable that most of these cables do not date to when the State Department first set up the 
system, when one might expect it would have been troubleshooting ways to reliably transfer 
data between different hardware and software platforms. Instead, most date to 1975-76, and 
coincide with some of Henry Kissinger’s most controversial actions at a time in which he was 
coming under increasing criticism for his conduct as Secretary of State. 
 
Intriguingly, the cables missing from the database also tend to be more highly classified, and 
often involve the most senior officials. Electronic messages classified as “Secret” were more 
than three times more likely to go missing compared to Unclassified and Limited Official Use 
messages (22% versus 6.5%). As for the CAT-C cables, we only have the electronic message 
text for 38%. For the rest, there is only an error message, e.g.: 
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MRN: 1975JAKART014946 SEGMENT NUMBER: 000001 EXPAND ERROR ENCOUNTERED; 
TELEGRAM TEXT FOR THIS SEGMENT IS UNAVAILABLE 
 
This particular record, an account of a meeting in Jakarta between Gerald Ford, Henry 
Kissinger, and Indonesian president Suharto, survived and was printed out in hard copy. But 
there are almost no State Department cables in the database from December 1-15, 1975, the 
first of several conspicuous gaps. When the cable was finally declassified in full in 2001, after 
the fall of the Suharto regime, it showed that Ford gave a green light to Suharto’s stated plan to 
conquer East Timor using U.S. arms. Realizing this would be in violation of American law, 
Kissinger advised Suharto to construe it as self-defense and delay the operation until Ford had 
returned home. But, he said, it was particularly important that “whatever you do succeeds 
quickly.” (Jakarta to State 1975) 
 
Kissinger was incensed when, later that month, a U.S. foreign service officer sent a cable that 
apparently confirmed this violation of U.S. law. Kissinger worried about how many people had 
already seen it. “​That will leak in three months and it will come out that Kissinger overruled his 
pristine bureaucrats and violated the law….Everything on paper will be used against me.” 
(Memorandum of Conversation 1975)​ ​This second cable is one of the 119 cables sent from 
Jakarta that same month which are now missing from the database.  
 
Other notable gaps in the electronic record include March 18-31 1976, when Kissinger 
supported the military coup in Argentina; May 25-31 1976, when he favored the Syrian invasion 
of Lebanon; and June 1976, when he met with the Prime Minister of South Africa in the midst of 
the Soweto Uprising against Apartheid. Of course, Kissinger and his staff were dealing with 
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many different subjects during these same periods. Even if it can be established that someone 
deliberately deleted the messages from the database, the data does not permit us to impute 
specific motives. But it is notable that the gaps end with the end of Kissinger’s term as secretary 
of State (See Fig. 2).  
 
Since Bentham and John Stuart Mill, philosophers have long postulated that secrecy serves to 
cover up the abuse of power, and that liberty requires transparency. As Louis Brandeis 
famously observed, “sunlight is...the best of disinfectants.” (Brandeis 1914) In analyzing the 
relationship between these different features, we find intriguing patterns that provide some 
empirical support for these beliefs. For instance, the first two years of the Carter administration 
witnessed rapid growth in the number of cables with the SHUM TAGS, designating those 
related to Human Rights. This was consistent with the Carter administration’s stated policy of 
promoting democratic values. There was also tremendous growth in the number of human rights 
organizations. Some, like Freedom House, also reported on the situation in each country, giving 
them a ‘Freedom in the World Score’ from 1 (best, e.g. Norway) to worst (7, e.g. North Korea). 
The index is calculated by grading the country across 10 political rights indicators, such as the 
electoral process. There are also 15 civil liberties indicators, such as freedom of expression, that 
are broadly derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
 
When we compare the percentage of cables diplomats wrote about human rights when 
reporting about different countries in 1977-78 (i.e. by counting the cables in which country 
TAGS co-reference SHUM TAGS, and comparing it to all cables with these country TAGS) we 
find only a very weak relationship with the score these countries received from Freedom House 
(an r of 0.2108108261.) In other words, whether U.S. diplomats were more or less concerned 
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with the human rights situation in a country had little to do with the human rights situation per 
se, at least as it was assessed by Freedom House. In fact, U.S. diplomats largely ignored the 
human rights situation in many allied countries with repressive governments. This is contrary to 
what outside critics like Jean Kirkpatrick argued at the time. They claimed that Carter had a 
blanket policy of criticizing human rights violations, which made little difference with Cold War 
adversaries and only served to delegitimate allied governments (Kirkpatrick, 1979).  
 
In fact, there is a striking regional variation in how much U.S. diplomats wrote about human 
rights -- even more striking when we limit the analysis to countries that imported U.S. arms in 
this period. Middle Eastern and Latin American countries both tended to have repressive 
governments, with an average Freedom House score of 4.7 and 4.5 respectively. But there was 
far more reporting about the human rights situation in Latin America compared to the Middle 
East. Of cables concerning Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, 5.96% reference Human Rights. For Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE, it’s <1% (.85%.) (See Fig. 3) 
 
These findings are consistent with earlier research by Qian and Yanagizaw showing a 
divergence between the annual State Department human rights reports and the assessments of 
Amnesty International. They found that the State Department showed favoritism towards its 
Cold War allies, which they identified according to how consistently other countries voted with 
the U.S. at the U.N. General Assembly. But they also control for regional diversity in their 
assessment (Qian and Yanagizaw 2009). We find that, in fact, the specific situation of allied 
countries in the Cold War is what is most strongly associated with whether the State Department 
showed any interest in human rights, and not just whether it criticized human rights violations in 
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published reports. When countries were well within the U.S. sphere of influence, and there was 
little risk of Soviet intervention, such as Latin America in 1973-78, foreign service officers 
frequently reported on detention, torture, and civil liberties. But they showed little interest in such 
issues in Middle Eastern countries, where the U.S. and the USSR were engaged in intense 
competition for influence and the risk of international conflict was high.  
 
Not coincidentally, countries of the Middle East were also far more likely to have a high 
percentage of secret cables. Almost fifteen percent (14.82%) of all cables with Middle Eastern 
country TAGS were classified as secret in 1973-78. For Latin American Countries, it was two 
percent (2.26%) 
 
Results: 
 
The great advantage of using a machine-learning approach to identify what specific records are 
more likely to be classified is that it can leverage many subtle interrelationships in 
multidimensional data. In this case, we used it to identify cables originally classified as Secret; 
Confidential; Limited Official Use; and Unclassified, which indicate the degree of sensitivity 
accorded to these communications by the officials who drafted them. We grouped them in 
various ways to measure the performance of different classifiers depending on how broadly or 
how narrowly one defines a state secret. Of all the features, the relative frequency of different 
words in the ​body ​ was the most useful in identifying sensitive information. High recall ​or 
precision (but not both) is achievable with some of the other features. For instance, it is possible 
to identify 95% of the cables that are classified as Secret, Confidential, or Limited Official Use 
just by using the ​sender/recipient ​ data. But fully a third of the identified cables would be false 
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positives. Other features produce better overall performance (see Fig. 4). But the best results 
came from combining all feature as independent vectors.  
 
Table 4 shows several performance measures when we categorize sensitive information more 
or less broadly. This can be assessed in terms of accuracy (Walther 2005) (how often is the 
classifier correct?), recall (also known as true positive rate: how many of the classified cables 
does it identify?), precision (or false positive rate: how many of the identified cables were 
actually classified?), and the average f1 score (the harmonic mean of precision and recall) for 
the two classes. We also present the AUC or ROC Score (Hanley 1982)​ ​- the area under the 
curve when plotting the true positive rate (y-axis) against the false positive rate (x-axis) as you 
vary the threshold for assigning observations to a given class. All of these metrics are derived 
from the true/false positive and negative counts.  
 
There is a notable improvement in performance when we exclude data that does not clearly 
belong to either category. The “Limited Official Use” designation has long been a cause for 
complaint. White House Executive Orders from the period classify as “Secret” information that 
“​could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security,” and include 
specific examples. ​“Confidential” was the classification for information that could cause 
“damage” but not “serious damage” (Federation of American Scientists 1972). Limited Official 
Use, on the other hand, had no such definition. When the George W. Bush administration 
attempted such a definition, the Government’s leading FOIA expert admitted it was “so broad 
that it is almost harder to think of information that does not fall within its scope than information 
that does” (Metcalfe 2009). This is consistent with our inability to distinguish these cables 
despite using many different features and multiple classifiers. It is not clear whether any NLP or 
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machine learning methods would accurately distinguish this category.  
 
But the results also show there is some logic in official secrecy, at least to the extent that State 
Department cables from the 1970s are indicative. Even when we include Limited Official Use 
cables, just a few kinds of metadata and the relative frequency of words in the message text are 
enough to identify 90% of classified cables with relatively few (<11%) false positives. Whether a 
diplomatic communication should be classified may therefore be relatively predictable -- more so 
than, say, predicting heart disease by data-mining medical records (Chaurasia 2014). 
 
If we were able to use all the diplomatic cables from the period, including both those that were 
lost and those that are still classified, we would likely achieve higher accuracy. But even with all 
of the data, these methods will sometimes miss crucial contextual elements, such as whether 
the subject of a seemingly innocuous travel reservation or visa application was on a sensitive 
mission (See Fig. 5). Other errors might instead reflect the intrinsic subjectivity of at least some 
classification decisions, especially considering that officials often receive inconsistent or 
inadequate guidance.  
 
When we began to examine the false positives and false negatives -- i.e. the cables we 
predicted would be classified, but were unclassified, and vice versa -- we found many instances 
of human error. For unclassified cables which the algorithm identified as having the highest 
probability of being classified, this included hundreds of examples where the cables were 
miscategorized as unclassified in the metadata, such as a report on Japanese government 
sensitivity about U.S. inspection of its nuclear facilities. The message text itself clearly showed it 
was originally confidential (Amembassy to Secstate 1977). Other errors included cables that 
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were originally secret when received at the State Department but were resent to another post as 
unclassified, such as  a report on what Lebanese Christian leaders said about ceasefire 
negotiations with the PLO (Secstate to Cinceur 1977). And there were many examples of 
unclassified cables that, according to experts with security clearances we consulted, would have 
been highly sensitive at the time. This included, for instance, what a confidential informant told 
U.S. diplomats in Cyprus about the kidnapping of the President’s son  (Fig. 2) (Secstate to 
Usdel 1977). 
 
Discussion: 
 
There is an upper limit to what any supervised learning algorithm​ can achieve in machine 
classification: it cannot be more accurate than the intrinsic consistency of the data allows. To 
the extent humans misclassify their communications -- or simply disagree about how they 
should be classified -- so too will algorithms.  
 
In the debate over the Clinton email, many appear to assume that the post-hoc review created 
what data scientists would call “ground truth” in identifying classified communications. But one 
could argue that Clinton and her aides were no less expert in recognizing what communications 
deserved to be classified and contained on a secure system. It might instead be seen as a 
natural experiment in inter-coder reliability in identifying state secrets. If so, this would be the 
government’s first such experiment in 75 years of creating official secrets, or at least the first in 
which it has published the results.  
 
But this experiment is flawed and incomplete, especially if it is expected to answer the question 
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of how careless Clinton and her aides were in handling email that were deemed to be classified. 
These “false negatives” constitute 6.9% of the total reviewed. Even if we accepted this as 
ground truth, we cannot begin to estimate either precision or recall -- and hence accuracy -- 
without reviewing the communications Clinton and her aides correctly classified as sensitive and 
protected on a secure system (true positives), and those which they ​overclassified ​ (false 
positives)​.​  Moreover, one would need to compare the error rate with the error rate for the rest of 
the State Department. Certainly, the idea that government officials make no errors in identifying 
sensitive national security information is not supported by the data.  
 
The historical data also show with new precision the extent to which officials have preserved, or 
failed to preserve, the official record. Whereas press coverage of the Clinton controversy has 
focused on very recent practices of using private e-mail, the historical record shows that 
diplomats have for centuries used both official and unofficial channels to control access to their 
communications. What has changed in recent years is that, with the use of electronic records, 
we can now use computational methods to analyze different kinds of communications. When 
records are “lost” it becomes more difficult, but these acts can also leave statistically 
conspicuous gaps in the public record that merit further scrutiny. Without this kind of analysis, a 
democracy loses the capacity to hold individuals and public institutions to account, a great asset 
against less democratic types of regimes that offsets their ability to act with even greater 
“secrecy and despatch.” When instead officials do not preserve the public record a democracy 
is doubly disadvantaged, losing both the capacity to identify and correct errors and 
incompetence, while still remaining relatively open and prone to leaking compared to autocratic 
states (Colaresi 2012).  
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Based on what we have learned from machine classification, it should be feasible to develop 
systems in which classified and unclassified communication streams would continually generate 
data that would be predictive of the appropriate classification level for new communications. 
Such a system would automatically default to the predicted classification, requiring manual 
override if the sender wished to classify at a higher or lower level (such as communications 
about a new classified program, or a subject that is no longer sensitive).  
 
The same type of system could be used for accelerating the release of electronic records, 
harnessing data from previous declassification decisions to prioritize records for close scrutiny 
that are most likely to have sensitive national security or personal information. These systems 
could therefore “nudge” officials to classify or declassify communications appropriately, and also 
reveal which officials tend to diverge from the norm when dealing with similar types of subjects, 
language, etc. Such a system could therefore be self-correcting, and become increasingly 
accurate as sources of error were continually identified and corrected for.  
 
What is most needed now is government support for applied research on technology to improve 
management of sensitive information (Public Interest Declassification Board 2012). This should 
include rigorous, double-blind testing of how consistent humans are in both classification and 
declassification. Without determining the expected error rate among humans, we will never 
know the baseline against which to test computer-assisted approaches -- or evaluate claims that 
this or that official was negligent in failing to recognize and protect state secrets. 
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Fig. 1:  
Proportion of Cables Classified as Secret 1974-1978  
The total includes all cables, including those that are still withheld, dating from the first year in 
which we have relatively complete data. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2:  
Number of Missing Cables, 1973-1978  
The number of cables by day with error messages in the place of message text. 
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Fig. 3:  
Percentage of Cables by Country Related to Human Rights and Percent Classified as Secret  
Countries with a severe human rights situation according to Freedom House are color-coded 
orange or red. The size of the bubble is proportionate to the number of cables with different 
country TAGS. The Y axis is a log scale showing which countries have a higher proportion of 
cables related to human rights. The X axis shows which countries have a higher proportion of 
cables classified as secret. 
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Fig. 4:  
Performance of Classifiers Using Different Features  
To determine which features are most useful, we tested the performance of classifiers for each 
one individually. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5:  
How We Measure Performance in Identifying State Secrets 
Classifiers can be optimized for either recall or precision. When the end-user has low tolerance  
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for risk, they will seek to maximize recall, i.e. the percentage of all cables with sensitive 
information they identify as classified, even if the result is lower precision, i.e. the percentage of 
all cables identified as classified that actually have sensitive information. But the false positives 
and false negatives include examples of human error in classification.  
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Table 1:  
Origin and Destination of Cables Most Likely To be Classified as Secret 
After filtering out the from/to pairs that did not send at least one hundred secret cables from 
1973-78, these are the ones that had the highest percentage of secret cables overall.  
 
 
From 
 
To 
Secret 
Cables 
Total 
Cables 
Percent 
Secret 
NATO STATE, SECDEF, INFO: 
MBFR VIENNA, BONN, 
LONDON, USNMR SHAPE, 
USCINCEUR 
426 436 97.71% 
CAIRO STATE SS MULTIPLE 104 109 95.41% 
SALT TALKS STATE 671 723 92.81% 
GENEVA 
USSALTTWO 
STATE 434 486 
89.30% 
TEL AVIV STATE SS MULTIPLE 145 163 88.96% 
STATE SECRETARY WHITE 
HOUSE 
121 
146 82.88% 
MBFR VIENNA STATE DOD 775 1075 72.09% 
STATE WHITE HOUSE 1464 2035 71.94% 
STATE JCS MULTIPLE 179 250 71.60% 
STATE USCINCEUR 131 258 50.78% 
 
Table 2:  
Concepts (or Keywords) With the Highest Proportion of Secret Cables 
After filtering out the concepts that did not appear in at least 1,000 cables from 1973-78, these 
are the ones that had the highest percentage of secret cables overall.  
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Concept 
Secret 
Cables 
Total 
Cables 
Percent 
Secret 
CAT-C 6,211 7,156 87.00% 
CAT-B 9,377 11,821 79.00% 
MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS 1,800 2,466 73.00% 
SALT (ARMS CONTROL) 1,950 2,990 65.00% 
CAT-A 3,234 5,158 63.00% 
FORCE & TROOP LEVELS 1,228 2,036 60.00% 
INTERIM GOVERNMENT 909 1,745 52.00% 
MISSILES 1,069 2,336 46.00% 
PEACE 845 1,838 46.00% 
PEACE PLANS 1,738 4,025 43.00% 
 
Table 3:  
Concepts With the Lowest Proportion of Secret Cables 
These are the more common “concepts” (>1,000 total cables) assigned to cables in which 
officials deemed <1% merited classification as “secret.”  
 
 
 
Concept 
Secret 
Cables 
Total 
Cables 
CIVIL AVIATION 75 16,715 
SCIENTIFIC VISITS 41 11,758 
TEXTILES 7 7,157 
MUSIC 26 6,439 
SEMINARS 25 5,756 
EXCEPTIONS LIST 13 5,312 
SCIENTIFIC MEETINGS 11 5,081 
LABOR UNIONS 24 5,009 
ENVIRONMENT 11 4,763 
MEATS 5 4,213 
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Table 4:  
Performance of Classifiers Using All Six Features for Different Tasks. 
Classifica 
-tion Task 
ROC/ 
AUC 
Score 
Accuracy 
Score 
Precision 
Score for Un- 
classified 
Precision 
Score for  
Classified 
Recall for  
Un- 
classified 
Recall for  
Classified 
Average 
f1-score 
(U vs L,C,S) 0.859 0.87 0.834 0.891 0.81 0.9 0.896 
(U,L vs C,S) 0.85 0.87 0.884 0.843 0.92 0.78 0.809 
(U,L,C vs S) 0.806 0.966 0.974 0.802 0.99 0.62 0.697 
(U vs C, S) 0.928 0.929 0.926 0.931 0.94 0.92 0.926 
 
Table 5: 
Counts and Classification Types of Cables with Information on Cables Considered Blank 
 
Situation Total in 
Database  
Unclassified Limited 
Official Use 
Confidential Secret 
declassified 
cables 
1,758,279 876,797 411,973 375,690 93,635 
Error messages 
for ​body 
119,744 53,935 21,744 25,233 18,832 
blank ​body 8282 2,726 1,645 1,924 1,987 
blank or n/a 
concepts 
634,967 445,300 114,507 65,502 9,658 
blank or n/a 
subject 
26,109 16,490 5,820 2,914 885 
blank or n/a 
from 
17 7 6 3 1 
blank or n/a ​to 9,740 6,027 1,572 1,698 443 
Used for 
classifier 
981,083 368,043 280,251 270,477 62,312 
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Supporting Information 
 
Data acquisition and preparation 
 
The Central Foreign Policy Files available from the US. National Archives include cables as well 
as so-called p-reel records, i.e. communications sent physically via diplomatic pouch. Both are 
either available in full or have been “withdrawn” because the record either has sensitive national 
security information or personal information. Both p-reel records and withdrawn cables have 
limited metadata, but neither has message text. We limited our analysis to cables that have 
been fully released.  
 
The metadata includes the original classification (​origclass​ ), i.e. Secret, Confidential, Limited 
Official​ ​Use and Unclassified. Cables with null, degenerated or misspelled names of classes in 
origclass​  were left out of the analysis. 
 
 
Table S1: 
Cable Counts and Classification According to Cable Type  
 
Cable_typ
e​  field 
Total in 
Database  
Unclassified Limited 
Official 
Use 
Confidential Secret Null or 
degenerated 
Full cables 1,758,279 876,797 411,973 375,690 93,635 184 
P-reel 505,030 419,052 33,887 28,695 14,716 0 
Withdrawn 
cables 
410,539 298,932 25,988 25,816 21,474 38,329 
P-reel 
withdrawn 
8,920 3,538 570 2,277 2,304 231 
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We first analyzed the cables to decide which fields could be useful as input features. The 
feature engineering involved analysis of the textual quality; discovering most common values for 
each class; and defining the subset valid for the tests. The fields that were added ​a posteriori​  to 
the creation of the cable were not used as they could convey information related to the 
classification. The main feature of interest is the ​body​  - the full text of the cable - although we 
have also dealt with other fields (Table S2). 
 
Table S2: 
Explanation of fields used in Classifier  
Used Fields Description 
origclass The original classification level of the cable  
body Full text of the cable 
subject Topic dealt with in the document. 
concepts Keywords attributed to the document 
TAGS Traffic Analysis by Geography and Subject 
from Which person/what office sent the document. 
to Which person/what office received the document. 
office Which State Department office or bureau was responsible for the document. 
date Document creation date 
 
 
Not all the cables that present ​cable_type​  field equal to ​full​  have useful content in the ​body​ . 
Some of them present errors in the digitization process and have, as their bodies, just small 
error messages, as illustrated in Table S3. 
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Table S3: 
Overview of Error Types in Full Cable Dataset and Count of Classification  
 
Type of errors in 
digitization 
Total in 
Database  
Unclassified Limited 
Official 
Use 
Confidential Secret 
“Error Reading Text 
Index” 
46,876 13,931 6,241 11,592 15,112 
“Expand Error 
Encountered” 
72,850 39,988 15,499 13,640 3,723 
“Encryption Error” 42 22 10 10 0 
Total (errors are not 
exclusive) 
119,744 53,935 21,744 25,233 18,832 
 
 
The tests aimed at predicting the level of sensitivity in a binary fashion; therefore, we have 
tested binary aggregations (called here scenarios) of the four classes grouping them according 
to broad or narrow definitions of secrecy: ​(S)ecret, (C)onfidential,​  ​(L)imited Official Use​  and 
(U)nclassified​ . Additional tests using four classes as targets were also performed, but the nature 
of the cables’ subjects and classification led to low recall and precision measurements.  
 
Once the features were selected, the database was queried, and the retrieved data were joined 
in a Python Pandas (McKinney 2010) Dataframe structure, we processed the raw textual data 
by eliminating hyphenation, tokenizing (separating words and discarding punctuation), and 
removing common, non-informative words such as  “and”, “the”, etc. Tests were made using 
stemmed forms of words, but it didn’t enhance the performance and the stemming was 
discarded. The field ​date​  was transformed in a boolean field ​weekday​  - indicating whether the 
date fell in a weekend or not; and another field ​year+month​ , used to test hypothesis on the 
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temporal nature of classification (i.e. a larger proportion might be classified during weekends, or 
periods of crisis). This did not prove useful for the whole span, although it could be promising for 
analysis of shorter periods of time. 
 
Feature vectors 
 
For each one of the features, and some feature combinations, we have applied a few forms of 
vectorization and tested the prediction power of the resulting vectors. Like Blei et al. (Blei 2003), 
we define the following terms: A word or token is the basic unit of discrete data, defined to be an 
item from a vocabulary indexed by {1,...,N}. Words are represented using vectors that have a 
single component equal to one and all other components equal to zero. A document vector is a 
sequence of N word counts denoted by w = (w1,w2,...,wN), where wn is the nth word in the 
sequence and N is the size of the vocabulary. A corpus is a collection of M documents denoted 
by D = {[w11, w21, ..., wN1],[w12, w22, ..., wN2], ..., [w1M, w2M, ..., wNM]}. 
 
With Bag of Words (BoW), documents are represented by vectors of dimension N, where N is 
the size of the vocabulary or the subset N of the most frequent words of the vocabulary; each 
column represents a word and the value is the frequency of that word in the document. TfIdf 
(Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency) also represents documents as vectors of 
dimension N, where N is the vocabulary size or the subset N of the most high-valued words in 
the vocabulary, based on the TfIdf metric: instead of word counts in the columns, it utilizes a 
method for emphasizing words that occur frequently in a given document (Tf), whilst 
de-emphasising words that occur frequently in many documents or in the whole corpus of 
documents (Idf). The count of the words in the vector is substituted by some weighting factor 
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(Salton 1988); in our case it is $ \mathrm{tfidf}(t,d,D) = \mathrm{tf}(t,d) + \mathrm{tf}(t,d) \times 
\mathrm{idf}(t, D) $ where t is the term, d is the document, and D is the corpus of documents. In 
our particular implementation, we have discarded terms that appeared in less than 2 
documents, eliminating some of the misspellings and hapaxes. 
 
We undertook extensive tests and hyperparameter optimization (​Bergstra 2012​) to determine 
the best parameters, and summarize the results in Table S.4. 
 
Table S.4: 
 
Overview of Parameters of Analysis against Feature Type 
Feature Number of 
Tokens 
Vocabular
y size (N) 
Max vector 
size (N’) 
Best n-gram 
range 
Best 
vectorization 
subject 6,894,992 180,480 8,000 (1,1) Term 
frequencies 
concepts 4,929,265 13,192 650 (1,2) Term 
frequencies 
body 259,276.062 1,929,902 15,000 (1,1) Term 
frequencies 
TAGS 3,272,125 939 844 (1,1) Term 
frequencies 
Embassy 
(​from​ /​to​ ) 
2,234,457 4,874 1,036 (1,1) Term 
frequencies 
office 1,937,707 261 170 (1,1) Term 
frequencies 
All Text 278,544,608 1,968,680 15,000 (1,1) Term 
frequencies 
 
 
 
Classifiers and Ensembles 
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We performed extensive tests with different classifiers: Linear Models (Logistic Regression, 
Passive Aggressive, Stochastic Gradient Descent, Ridge Regression; Perceptron); Support 
Vector Machines (Linear SVC); K-Nearest Neighbors​; Bayesian Approaches (Bernoulli Naive 
Bayes, Multinomial Naive Bayes)​; ensembles of classifiers (​Random Forests, Extremely 
Randomized Trees​) and combined techniques such as bagging and boosting (Bagging 
Classifier, ​Gradient Boosting, AdaBoost and weighted voting approaches​). See supplementary 
references for more on these different approaches.  
 
In order to choose the best classifiers for the task, a prediction comparison was made in 
advance, using all textual features combined and the scenario [U (class 0) vs L,C,S (class 1)]. 
Each one of them had its parameters optimized for the task with grid search. The results for 
BoW/TfIdf vectorization scores are shown in Table S5. 
 
Table S5: 
Performance of All Classifiers Across Various Measures 
 
Classifier ROC/AUC 
Score 
Accuracy 
Score 
Precision 
(class 0/1) 
Recall  
(class 0/1) 
F1-score 
(class 0/1) 
Stochastic Gradient 
Descent 
0.8462/ 
0.8338 
0.8576/ 
0.8512 
(0.82/0.88)/ 
(0.83/0.86) 
(0.80/0.89)/ 
(0.76/0.90) 
(0.81/0.89)/ 
(0.79/0.88) 
Logistic Regression 0.8457/ 
0.8434 
0.8569/ 
0.8574 
(0.81/0.88)/ 
(0.82/0.88) 
(0.80/0.89)/ 
(0.79/0.90) 
(0.81/0.89)/ 
(0.81/0.89) 
Linear SVM* 0.8454/ 
0.8452 
0.8563/ 
0.8583 
(0.81/0.88)/ 
(0.82/0.88) 
(0.80/0.89)/ 
(0.79/0.90) 
(0.81/0.89)/ 
(0.81/0.89) 
Ridge 0.8261/ 
0.8373 
0.8448/ 
0.8546 
(0.82/0.86)/ 
(0.83/0.87) 
(0.75/0.90)/ 
(0.77/0.91) 
(0.78/0.88)/ 
(0.80/0.89) 
Bagging (w/ Dec. 
Tree)  
0.8048/ 
0.8049 
0.8172/ 
0.8173 
(0.76/0.85)/ 
(0.76/0.85) 
(0.76/0.85)/ 
(0.76/0.85) 
(0.76/0.85)/ 
(0.76/0.85) 
Extremely 
Randomized Trees 
0.8036/ 
0.7938 
0.8365/ 
0.83 
(0.86/0.83)/ 
(0.86/0.82) 
(0.67/0.94)/ 
(0.65/0.94) 
(0.76/0.88)/ 
(0.74/0.87) 
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AdaBoost (w/ 
Random F.) 
0.8031/ 
0.8072 
0.8190/ 
0.8222 
(0.77/0.85)/ 
(0.77/0.85) 
(0.74/0.87)/ 
(0.75/0.87) 
(0.75/0.86)/ 
(0.76/0.86) 
Random Forest 0.7964/ 
0.7994 
0.8310/ 
0.8316 
(0.86/0.82)/ 
(0.85/0.82) 
(0.66/0.94)/ 
(0.67/0.93) 
(0.74/0.87)/ 
(0.75/0.87) 
Perceptron* 0.7856/ 
0.7963 
0.8138/ 
0.8112 
(0.80/0.82)/ 
(0.75/0.84) 
(0.67/0.90)/ 
(0.74/0.86) 
(0.73/0.86)/ 
(0.75/0.85) 
Passive 
Aggressive* 
0.7745/ 
0.8226 
0.8095/ 
0.837 
(0.82/0.81)/ 
(0.79/0.86) 
(0.63/0.91)/ 
(0.76/0.88) 
(0.71/0.86)/ 
(0.78/0.87) 
Multinomial Naive 
Bayes 
0.7735/ 
0.7828 
0.7614/ 
0.7992 
(0.64/0.87)/ 
(0.74/0.83) 
(0.82/0.73)/ 
(0.72/0.85) 
(0.72/0.79)/ 
(0.73/0.84) 
Bernoulli Naive 
Bayes 
0.6885/ 
0.6885 
0.6538/ 
0.6538 
(0.52/0.84)/ 
(0.52/0.84) 
(0.83/0.55)/ 
(0.83/0.55) 
(0.64/0.66)/ 
(0.64/0.66) 
 
Some classifiers did better with BoW vectorization and others with TfIdf. Based on these tests, 
we chose an ensemble with the seven best estimators (​Stochastic Gradient Descent, Logistic 
Regression, Ridge, Bagging, Extremely Randomized Trees, AdaBoost and Multinomial Naive 
Bayes) ​and using weights 2,2,1,1,1,1,1 for our main experiment.  
 
Evaluation of Results 
 
Table S6 presents the performance of the classifier for the three combinations of classes using 
each feature as input as well as two feature combinations. The fields ​body​ , ​subject​ , ​concepts​ , 
tags​ , ​embassy​  and ​office​  were added together in a new field/feature ​all_text​ , which was tested 
as an alternative to combining all the other features by concatenating those vectors. All vectors 
were produced using plain count BoW. All measures are calculated as a mean of the three folds 
using stratified k-fold. 
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Table S6: 
Performance of Classifier in Different Capacities by Feature Type 
 
Feature Class 
Combination 
ROC/AU
C Score 
Accuracy 
Score 
Precision 
(class 0/1) 
Recall  
(class 0/1) 
Average 
f1-score 
Subject (U vs L,C,S) 0.79 0.82 0.81/0.82 0.68/0.91 0.74/0.86 
(U,L vs C,S)  0.80 0.83 0.85/0.77 0.89/0.72 0.87/0.74 
(U,L,C vs S) 0.70 0.96 0.99/0.80 0.99/0.40 0.98/0.53 
Concepts (U vs L,C,S) 0.72 0.75 0.69/0.77 0.59/0.84 0.63/0.81 
(U,L vs C,S)  0.74 0.78 0.80/0.74 0.89/0.58 0.84/0.65 
(U,L,C vs S) 0.68 0.91 0.96/0.75 0.99/0.36 0.97/0.48 
Body (U vs L,C,S) 0.83 0.84 0.79/0.87 0.78/0.88 0.79/0.87 
(U,L vs C,S)  0.81 0.84 0.85/0.82 0.92/0.70 0.88/0.75 
(U,L,C vs S) 0.68 0.95 0.96/0.76 0.99/0.36 0.98/0.49 
TAGS (U vs L,C,S) 0.74 0.78 0.75/0.79 0.61/0.88 0.67/0.83 
(U,L vs C,S)  0.75 0.79 0.82/0.72 0.87/0.63 0.84/0.67 
(U,L,C vs S) 0.62 0.95 0.95/0.73 0.99/0.25 0.97/0.38 
Embassies 
(From/To) 
(U vs L,C,S) 0.57 0.67 0.71/0.66 0.19/0.95 0.30/0.78 
(U,L vs C,S)  0.59 0.69 0.70/0.65 0.93/0.24 0.80/0.35 
(U,L,C vs S) 0.57 0.94 0.94/0.72 1.00/0.14 0.97/0.24 
Office (U vs L,C,S) 0.67 0.73 0.76/0.72 0.42/0.92 0.54/0.81 
(U,L vs C,S)  0.62 0.73 0.71/0.83 0.97/0.27 0.82/0.41 
(U,L,C vs S) 0.62 0.95 0.95/0.79 1.00/0.25 0.97/0.38 
All_Text (U vs L,C,S) 0.85 0.86 0.82/0.88 0.81/0.89 0.81/0.89 
(U,L vs C,S)  0.84 0.87 0.88/0.84 0.92/0.76 0.90/0.80 
(U,L,C vs S) 0.78 0.92 0.97/0.78 0.99/0.57 0.98/0.66 
All 
Features 
(U vs L,C,S) 0.86 0.87 0.83/0.89 0.81/0.90 0.82/0.90 
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(independe
nt vectors) 
(U,L vs C,S)  0.85 0.87 0.88/0.84 0.92/0.78 0.90/0.81 
(U,L,C vs S) 0.81 0.97 0.97/0.80 0.99/0.61 0.98/0.69 
(U vs C, S) 0.93 0.93 0.93/0.93 0.94/0.92 0.93/0.93 
 
Upon determining that using all feature as independent vectors produced the best results, we 
applied this method to a corpus in which all the cables are clearly identified as classified or 
unclassified, i.e. with no Limited Official Use (L) cables in either the training or test set. The 
ROC Score of ~0.93 -- the best result of all the tasks -- indicates how these ambiguous cables 
limit the performance of classifiers for identifying state secrets. The misclassified cables -- both 
false positives and false negatives -- were also presented to two domain experts with the 
classification removed. They were more likely to agree with the algorithm in judging cables to 
have information that would have been sensitive in the era they were created. 
  
 
Figure S1:  
 
AUC scores for all features 
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Figure S2:  
Precision vs. recall for each feature and the combination of features 
 
 
Using all features yielded the best results in all scenarios, closely followed by the summation of 
textual fields, then body and subject. The other features did not show good performance taken 
alone.  
 
Discussion 
 
Results over 80% in classification tasks are generally regarded as good (e.g. the Netflix 
challenge, in which the best result was ~85%)(Netflix 2009). But whether such results are 
adequate depends on the task at hand. If our priority is to protect sensitive information, and we 
wish to minimize the number of false negatives, i.e., cables that are predicted to be unclassified 
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but are in fact classified, the classification thresholds could be altered at the cost of increasing 
the number of false positives. 
 
Our current developments point to future enhancements of the classifier. We are testing an 
implementation of an Artificial Neural Network, exploring new features, and developing methods 
to correct errors in the metadata (original classes). These methods may further improve the 
results.  
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